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Tensions Underlying the Indian Child Welfare Act:
Tribal Jurisdiction over Traditional State Court
Family Law Matters
State courts have historically exercised jurisdiction over family law
cases. However, under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), Indian
child custody and adoption cases have been taken out of state jurisdiction
and placed with Indian tribal governments. State courts have pushed
back against proper deference to ICWA and violate ICWA by misapplying its provisions and refusing to transfer custody and adoption cases to
tribal courts. This Note analyzes the state-tribal tensions surrounding
ICWA and argues that the primary reason for the lack of full state
acceptance of ICWA is that, historically, states have had nearly total
jurisdiction over family law disputes, particularly those that go to the
core of ICWA—child custody and adoption. In recent years, some states
have changed their tune and have sought to appropriately apply ICWA.
Even so, misapplication of the law remains a problem in many state
courts. In December 2016, for the first time since ICWA was enacted, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs published updated rules and guidelines to
clarify ICWA requirements. This is a major step toward full compliance
of ICWA in state courts, despite the resistance of states to relinquish
their jurisdiction over Indian family law cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
State courts have historically exercised jurisdiction over family
law issues.1 The federal government has in most cases left the
determination of domestic relations disputes to state courts and
legislatures due to state court expertise in the area and the federal
government’s dislike of deciding family law cases.2 However,
through the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act) enacted
in 1978, Indian child custody and adoption issues have been taken
out of state jurisdiction and placed with Indian tribal governments.3 Before ICWA, Indian children faced risk of removal from
their homes at disproportionately high rates and were typically
placed in non-Indian homes which contributed to the breakup of
Indian families and ultimately the loss of tribal members.4 The
1. Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV.
1073, 1073 (1994).
2. Id. at 1073–74.
3. In re M.M., 154 Cal. App. 4th 897, 907 (2007).
4. Thomas R. Myers & Jonathan J. Siebers, The Indian Child Welfare Act: Myths and
Mistaken Application, 83 MICH. B.J. 19 (2004). Congress found “that an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and
institutions.” 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006); see also Jessica Di Palma, Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl: The Supreme Court’s Distorted Interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 47 LOY . L.A.
L. REV. 523, 525–26 (2014).
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purpose of ICWA is to reverse the historic and recent effects of
removal of Indian children from their homes and tribal communities5 through both procedural and substantive protections in
custody proceedings6 so that “where possible, an Indian child
should remain in the Indian community.”7
Not all state courts have easily parted with this portion of
family law.8 State courts have pushed back against full implementation and support of ICWA because of their traditional jurisdiction over family law matters. From the early years of the
existence of the United States, states have struggled against the
sovereignty of Indian tribes.9 Instead of accepting tribes as third
sovereigns, as the federal government dictates, states often view
tribal jurisdiction as an intrusion into state authority.10 In recent
decades, the federal government has begun to federalize certain
aspects of family law, taking matters such as abortion and the
definition of marriage out of the hands of states and into the
regulation and constitutional determination of the federal government.11 Many states have found ways to skirt around tribal jurisdiction where ICWA should apply and make Indian child custody
determinations in state court.12 Two prominent state court misapplications of ICWA include the best interest of the child exception
and the existing Indian family exception.13
The result of state violations of ICWA is that the purpose of
ICWA in keeping Indian children in their homes and communities
is not met.14 Some states have taken steps to ensure the proper

See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 1, 292 (2012).
Myers, supra note 4, at 20.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978).
See Patrice Kunesh-Hartman, The Indian Welfare Act of 1978: Protecting Essential
Tribal Interests, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 131, 140 (1989) (discussing In re Lelah-Puc-Ka-Chee, the
earliest reported case involving tribal-state family law tensions).
9. See generally id. at 139–40.
10. See id. at 140.
11. LYNN D. WARDLE, MARK P. STRASSER & LYNNE MARIE KOHM, FAMILY LAW FROM
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES: CASES AND COMMENTARY ch. 1 § D (2014); see also discussion infra
Section III.B.
12. Suzanne L. Cross, Angelique G. Day & Emily C. Proctor, Working on the Front
Lines, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT THIRTY 3, 5 (Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Wenona T. Singel & Kathryn E. Fort eds., 2009).
13. Id.
14. Id.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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application of ICWA; however, the most important response to
the inconsistent state court application of ICWA has come from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the BIA). In 2015 and 2016, the BIA
published new ICWA guidelines and revised rules.15 These new
regulations were designed to improve the proper and consistent
application of ICWA across the country, thus protecting Indian
children and communities.16
This note will examine the lack of state acceptance of ICWA,
arguing that this lack of acceptance stems primarily from states
seeking to maintain control over child custody family law matters
that have traditionally been left to state courts to decide. ICWA is
the main intrusion into their jurisdiction in this area, and state
courts are reluctant to recognize tribal sovereignty, especially in
difficult and emotionally charged child custody disputes. Part II
reviews the history and nature of tribal sovereignty and the relationship between the three sovereigns: the federal government,
states, and tribes. This background is important to understanding
the sovereignty of tribes and the tension between tribal and state
jurisdiction. Part III discusses the history of state family law jurisdiction. Part IV analyzes the purposes and provisions of ICWA.
Part V examines state court misapplication or lack of application of
ICWA. Part VI discusses the recent ICWA rules and guidelines implemented by the BIA and the potential future impact of those regulations on state court ICWA implementation. Part VII concludes.
II. HISTORY OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. Discovery and Settlement
The United States recognizes tribal sovereignty. The Supreme
Court in Worcester v. Georgia stated that “Indian nations had
always been considered as distinct, independent political
15. See Suzette Brewer, BIA Releases New ICWA Guidelines to Protect Native Families
and Children, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 26, 2015), https://indiancountrymedianetwork
.com/news/politics/bia-releases-new-icwa-guidelines-to-protect-native-families-and-children/
[hereinafter Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines]; Suzette Brewer, Breaking: BIA Publishes Final
ICWA Rule, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (June 8, 2016), https://indiancountrymedia
network.com/news/politics/breaking-bia-publishes-final-icwa-rule/ [hereinafter Brewer,
Final ICWA Rule]; 25 C.F.R. § 23 (2016).
16. See sources cited supra note 15.
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communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”17 However,
those nations who “discovered” America and its indigenous peoples did not always subscribe to the idea that Indian nations are
sovereign and retain rights.18
The lack of recognition of tribal sovereignty began during the
discovery of the Americas with European efforts to convert the
native population. The Catholic Crusades of the eleventh through
thirteenth centuries were the beginning of an effort to bring
Christianity to non-Christian peoples outside Europe.19 These holy
wars were justified because the pope had the responsibility to lead
the “infidels” to Christian conversion.20 This attitude carried on
during the European settlement of the Americas. Conversion was
seen as necessary because the natives did not have a common
religion or law; did not have normal social intercourse, money,
metal, or writing; did not have European-style clothing; and
“lived like animals.”21 According to Pope Innocent IV, “[t]he pope
can order infidels to admit preachers of the Gospel” and “if the
infidels do not obey, they ought to be compelled by the secular
arm and war may be declared against them . . . .”22
The European’s perceived right to settlement was based on the
Doctrine of Discovery.23 The Doctrine of Discovery posited that
the first European, Christian nation to discover new lands automatically gained exclusive property rights of the non-Christian
nation, even though the natives already occupied those lands.24
England claimed rights of first discovery through John Cabot’s
discoveries of the east coast of North America.25 France’s
17. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832).
18. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 4.
19. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 44–45

(7th ed. 2011).
20. Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV.
1, 9–10 (2005).
21. Id. at 10.
22. Innocent IV, Commentaria Doctissima in Quinque Libros Decretalium, in THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE: THE FIRST PHASE 191–92 (James Muldoon ed., 1977); see also Miller, supra
note 20, at 11 (“[T]he pope had authority to deprive pagans of their property and
sovereignty when they failed to admit Christian missionaries or violated natural law.”).
23. See Miller, supra note 20, at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 16.
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contestation of England’s claims ultimately led to the French and
Indian War, after which France ceded its claims east of the
Mississippi to England and west of the Mississippi to Spain.26
Jamestown was the first permanent English colony in North
America, and justification for its establishment was that the
English were bringing the glory of God and civility to people who
lived in darkness and ignorance.27 In Calvin’s Case, one of the most
important English cases of this period, England’s Lord Chief
Justice Edward Coke stated that Indians are perpetual enemies to
Christians.28 The court adopted the Doctrine of Discovery and
stated that “if a Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an
infidel, and bring them under his subjection, there ipso facto the
laws of the infidel are abrogated.”29
Many European nations issued grants and charters to their
subjects, asserting jurisdiction over discovered lands.30 For example, Columbus was given permission for an Atlantic crossing by
the Spanish Crown in 1492.31 Peaceful means of settlement between European nations occurred “principally because it was
more expedient for the individual nations to compromise their
exaggerated claims than to fight over them.”32 It was easier to give
up some land rather than war with other nations. In voyage
accounts, Indians were seen as mere objects of European desires:
for labor, wealth, or from which to gain land.33
Not every European believed that the Indians lacked land
rights, however. During the time of colonial settlement, Spanish
legal theorists questioned the authority of the Crown’s rights
against the Native Americans.34 The most famous of these theorists

Id.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 55.
Miller, supra note 20, at 28.
Calvin v. Smith (Calvin’s Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (K.B. 1608); 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 17 b.
WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN’S LAND WHITE MAN’S LAW 27–33 (2d ed. 1995).
Christopher Columbus, BRITANNICA O NLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.britan
nica.com/print/article/127070 (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
32. WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 32.
33. Id. at 28.
34. Miller, supra note 20, at 13.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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was Franciscous de Victoria (c. 1483–1546).35 Victoria developed
three arguments relating to Spanish explorations, later adopted as
the “Law of Nations” on Indian rights and status.36
The first argument was that because Indians were rational
beings, they possessed natural legal rights.37 The Indians “undoubtedly had true dominion in both public and private matters,
just like Christians, and that neither their princes nor private
persons could be despoiled of their property on the ground of
their not being true owners.”38 His second argument was that
Spanish claim to title of land in the Americas through papal grant
could not affect the Indian’s inherent rights.39 Indian refusal to
accept the Christian faith did not create justification for waging
war on them or seizing their land.40 Although Victoria believed
that Indians had inherent rights, his third argument mirrored the
basic European presumption that Indians were inferior to their
conquerors. Victoria’s third argument was that the Indians’
violations of the Law of Nations “might . . . justify a Christian
nation’s conquest and colonial empire.”41 If the Indians violated
the natural law rights of the Spanish, which included the right to
travel to foreign lands, engage in trade and commerce, and send
missionaries to teach the gospel, then Spain had the right to
defend itself through a lawful and just war.42
35. See Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United
States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 11–12 (1942); Susan L. Piepke, Francisco de Vitoria, SALEM PRESS
BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (2013).
36. Miller, supra note 20, at 14.
37. Id.
38. FRANCISCI DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES 128 (Ernest Nys
ed., John Pawley Bate trans., 1917). “Now the rule of the law of nations is that what belongs
to nobody is granted to the first occupant . . . . And so, as the object in question was not
without an owner, it does not fall under the title which we are discussing . . . . [B]y itself it
gives no support to a seizure of the aborigines any more than if it had been they who had
discovered us.” Id. at 139.
39. Miller, supra note 20, at 14.
40. VICTORIA, supra note 38, at 137–39.
41. Miller, supra note 20, at 14 (internal citation omitted).
42. Id. at 14–15; VICTORIA, supra note 38, at 154.
If the Indians—whether it be their lords or the populace—prevent the Spaniards
from freely preaching the Gospel, the Spaniards, after first reasoning with them
in order to remove scandal, may preach it despite their unwillingness and devote
themselves to the conversion of the people in question, and if need be they may
then accept or even make war, until they succeed in obtaining facilities and
safety for preaching the Gospel . . . . if there is no other way to carry on the work
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B. Tribal Sovereign Nations
The roots of the tension between state and tribal sovereignty
began with the United States’ dealings with the tribes as sovereign
nations, illustrated by the negotiation of treaties and the guardianward relationship.43 This section provides background and context of U.S.–tribal relations.
1. British-tribal dealings
Throughout early discovery and settlement, the Doctrine of
Discovery and the protectionist relationship were relied upon to
deny Indians’ rights to their territory.44 Under the Doctrine of
Discovery, the Crown could unilaterally take Indian lands; however, in practice “the colonies frequently obtained the consent of
the tribes through treaties and purchases in order to settle Indianclaimed lands.”45 When they could not obtain consent, sometimes
colonists turned to fraud, duress, or confiscation to acquire the
desired lands.46
After the French and Indian War, according to King
George III’s Royal Proclamation of 1763, territory east of the
mountains was off limits to settlement and reserved for the tribes
in order to avoid another costly war.47 The proclamation stated
that the British had control over Indian land and had the right to
extinguish Indian title, and in exchange, Britain would protect the
Indians as wards.48 George Washington refused to accept the
King’s proclamation and ordered surveys of the tribes’ land.49
Colonists did not believe the Crown had a right to restrict land

of religion, this furnishes the Spaniards with another justification for seizing the
lands and territory of the natives and for setting up new lords there and putting
down the old lords and doing in right of war everything which it is permitted in
other just wars . . . .
Id. at 157.
43. JASON EDWARD BLACK, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE RHETORIC OF REMOVAL AND
ALLOTMENT 22, 23 (2015); see generally Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 140–41.
44. See Miller, supra note 20, at 28.
45. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 57.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 60.
48. BLACK, supra note 43, at 22.
49. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 60.
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sale transactions between themselves and the Indians and
therefore continued to speculate in Indian lands.50 Many Indians
also challenged the Crown’s governing and met with the British to
discuss grievances.51
2. United States–tribal dealings
After the colonists defeated the British in the Revolutionary
War, the United States continued the British tradition of dealing
with the tribes through treaties.52 “The government promised
security to American Indians in exchange for safe passage through
Indian territory and the surrender of Native lands.”53 The tribes
were regarded as sovereign nations with the right to govern their
people, and all formal negotiations between the tribes and the
governments were accomplished through treaties.54
Although the Indian tribes were considered sovereign nations,
they did not have full rights to their lands.55 In the seminal case on
Indian land ownership, Johnson v. McIntosh, the Supreme Court of
the United States accepted the Doctrine of Discovery as the root of
all land titles in the United States and held that, under this doctrine, Indians did not have the right to sell their land.56 The rights
of the British government of title to all lands occupied by the
Indians passed to the United States,57 and “the Indian inhabitants
[were] to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected,
indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 22–23.
BLACK, supra note 43, at 23.
Id.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 5–6.
See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 62.
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).

The British government, which was then our government, and whose rights have
passed to the United States, asserted title to all the lands occupied by Indians,
within the chartered limits of the British colonies. It asserted also a limited
sovereignty over them, and the exclusive right of extinguishing the title which
occupancy gave to them. These claims have been maintained and established as
far west as the river Mississippi, by the sword. The title to a vast portion of the
lands we now hold, originates in them. It is not for the Courts of this country to
question the validity of this title, or to sustain one which is incompatible with it.
Id. at 588–89 (1823).
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deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others.”58
“[D]iscovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title
of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest . . . .”59 In
McIntosh, the Supreme Court also determined that land transfers
made before the Revolution were invalid.60 The consequence of
McIntosh was that Indians had legal right of occupancy, but the
U.S. government owned the land. Therefore, the tribes’ rights as
completely independent, sovereign nations were diminished.61
Even though treaties between the United States and tribes set
aside Indian reservations and explicitly provided that the land set
aside was not to be encroached upon by non-Indians, white settlers continued to intrude on Indian land.62 Rather than enforce
boundaries and remove settlers from Indian lands, the United
States continually renegotiated treaties with tribes, resulting in
diminished tribal territory.63 For example, Cherokee Nation land
once covered five states, but by the Era of Removal, the tribe’s
only land lay in Georgia.64 Despite failing to deal fairly with the
Indian tribes, the United States continued to make treaties with
the tribes, thereby showing that it continued to recognize them as
sovereign nations.65 This recognition has been relied upon to assert tribal sovereignty in later Supreme Court cases.66 Additionally, support for enacting ICWA came from the determination “that
Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the
protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources.”67

Id. at 584, 591.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 543.
BLACK, supra note 43, at 34–35.
See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 96.
Id.
Id.
Miller, supra note 20, at 22.
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515 (1832).
67. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1901(2) (West 2006). “[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.” Id. § 1901(3).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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C. Removal
U.S.–tribal dealings through treaties resulted in loss of land
owned by Indians. A continuing desire for more land drove the
Removal Era. Removal was a way the U.S. government could
move the tribes who lived east of the Mississippi River to the west
by exchanging their current lands. This practice opened the
eastern lands to further white settlement.68 Removal began when
efforts to assimilate the Indian into American agriculture, trading,
education, and domestication failed.69 Numerous justifications
were relied upon for the removal of tribes, including the assumed
inferiority of Indians and their inability to assimilate into white
civilization.70 The principal motivating factor to the whites, however, was to obtain more land.71
The Era of Indian Removal began with President Thomas
Jefferson, and in 1830 President Andrew Jackson encouraged Congress to pass the Indian Removal Act.72 President Jackson held the
view that tribes should not be treated as independent nations and
that they could not exist independently within the states. It was
thus believed that Indians must assimilate and submit to the laws
of the state or move west.73 The Removal Act provided that land
west of the Mississippi that was not part of a territory or state
would be available for tribes should they choose to exchange their
current lands and move west.74 The Removal Act also provided
that the new land in the West would be guaranteed by the federal
government to the Indians and their heirs.75
Several Supreme Court cases decided during the Removal Era
shed light on the scope of jurisdiction and sovereignty between
the states and the tribes.76 Relying on federal policy, Georgia
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 7.
BLACK, supra note 43, at 27.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 94.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 7.
Id.; Indian Removal Act of 1830, 21st Cong. Sess. I. Ch. 148, 411–12 (1830), https://
memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=004/llsl004.db&recNum=458.
73. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 100.
74. Id. at 98.
75. Id. (noting that the Removal Act also provided that “such lands shall revert to the
United States, if the Indians become extinct, or abandon the same”).
76. E.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515 (1832).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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passed a law that added Cherokee lands to state lands.77 The tribe
appealed to the federal government for intervention; however,
their plea fell on deaf ears.78 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the
Supreme Court provided an explanation of tribal sovereignty.79
Chief Justice John Marshall explained that Indian tribes are distinct political societies based on the relationship of trust between
the tribes and the federal government.80 A tribe’s relation to the
United States is that of a ward to his guardian.81 Although they
have “unquestioned right to the lands they occupy,” they are not
fully sovereign nations but “domestic dependent nations.”82 Similarly, in Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall held that Georgia laws had
no effect within the Cherokee territory.83 However, Georgia
refused to obey the Court’s mandate, and President Jackson supported Georgia’s “claimed sovereignty over Cherokee lands.”84
Although the Cherokee challenged the removal policy, in 1838,
thousands of Cherokee were forcibly removed from Georgia on
the Trail of Tears to what is present-day Oklahoma.85
D. Allotment and Assimilation
Allotment forced assimilation of Indians into white culture
and further diminishment of tribal lands. Further expansion
westward meant that tribes who had removed to the West were
soon surrounded by settlers, whose thirst for land did not stop at
the Mississippi.86 The Allotment policy, beginning in 1887, served
to open up even more land for white settlement.87 The General
Allotment Act, known as the Dawes Act, allotted the reservations
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 100.
Id.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16–20.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. (“Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely
upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the
president as their great father.”).
82. Id. at 17.
83. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
84. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 122–23.
85. See generally BLACK, supra note 43, at 59; ANDREW DENSON, MONUMENTS TO
ABSENCE: CHEROKEE REMOVAL AND THE CONTEST OVER SOUTHERN MEMORY (2017).
86. BLACK, supra note 43, at 81.
87. See PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8–9.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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to individual tribal members in order to further the objectives of
assimilating Indians and extinguishing tribal sovereignty.88 The
reservation lands were divided, with some sections going to Indians and the rest being sold to non-Indian farmers and ranchers.89
It was thought that the tribes would soon dissolve and the Indians
would be absorbed into the settler community.90 With the loss of
land due to Allotment, the tribes lost their ability to be selfsufficient and became more dependent on the federal government
for rations and services.91
Judicial decisions and legislation passed around the Allotment
Era continued to have conflicting outcomes regarding tribal sovereignty and federal power over tribes. In Ex Parte Crow Dog, the
Supreme Court affirmed the principle of tribal sovereignty.92 The
issue in Crow Dog was whether the federal government had jurisdiction to try an Indian man for murdering another Indian man in
Indian country.93 The Court held that the tribe, not the federal
government, had jurisdiction.94 In discussing the general policy of
the government toward the Indians, the Court stated that the
Indian tribes were
semi-independent tribes whom our government has always
recognized as exempt from our laws, whether within or without
the limits of an organized State or Territory, and, in regard to
their domestic government, left to their own rules and traditions,
in whom we have recognized the capacity to make treaties, and
with whom the governments, State and national, deal . . . in their
national or tribal character . . . .95

The Court reasoned that tribes have their own sovereignty and
unless there is a clear expression by Congress indicating otherwise,
statutes and treaties should be read narrowly to avoid abridgment
of that sovereignty.96

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 335 (1998).
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 140–41.
Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 571–72.
Id. at 572 (quoting United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617).
Id. at 572.
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On the other hand, some subsequent federal actions served to
undermine tribal sovereignty. Congress reacted to Crow Dog by
enacting the Major Crimes Act in 1885, which gave the United
States jurisdiction over certain serious crimes committed by an
Indian against another Indian, in Indian country.97 In United
States v. Kagama, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Major Crimes Act based on the trust relationship, which
maintains that Indians are wards of the nation and are dependent
on and need protection from the United States.98 Although the
Supreme Court reinforced the plenary power of Congress to
abridge tribal criminal jurisdiction, the Court also noted the lack
of state jurisdiction over the tribes99: “These Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation . . . . They owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies.”100
In addition to taking away criminal jurisdiction from tribal
governments in cases in which Indians commit certain crimes on
reservations, “Congress placed federal agents on reservations to
supervise tribal activities more closely.”101 Although the Supreme
Court recognized tribal sovereignty in Crow Dog, in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, the Court held that Congress has the power to abrogate
treaties.102 The Court held that legislation that allowed Congress
to divest tribes of their lands, in breach of the terms of a treaty,
was constitutional.103 The Court reasoned that Congress has exercised plenary power over tribal relations from the beginning of
their relationship and this was a political power, not to be questioned by the judiciary.104

97. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 157; 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
98. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–85 (1886); see also BLACK, supra note

43, at 99.
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84.
Id.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903); see also PEVAR, supra note 5, at
50 (“According to the Court, a federal treaty and a federal law have equal authority. In the
same way that Congress may pass a federal law that amends or repeals an earlier law,
Congress may also pass a law that amends or repeals an earlier treaty.”).
103. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566.
104. Id. at 565.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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E. Boarding School Era
Throughout the history of the conquest of Indian lands and
the U.S. government’s dealings with Indian tribes, the tribes
became weak and were forced into dependence.105 The federal
government’s use of Indian boarding schools added to the weakening of tribes and contributed to the need for safeguarding Indian children and tribes through legislation such as ICWA.
The Boarding School Era began in the Allotment Era, during
which Indian children were taken from their homes and sent to
boarding schools where they were stripped of their culture and
“civilized.”106 The boarding schools were run by government and
private missions and generally located far from the reservations.107
More than 200 boarding schools had been established by 1887
with more than 14,000 Indian children, who had largely been
forcibly removed from their homes.108
Like the General Allotment Act, the goal of the boarding
schools was to assimilate and civilize the Indians.109 Captain
Richard Henry Pratt, the founder of the Carlisle Indian boarding
school in Pennsylvania said, “all the Indian there is in the race
should be dead. Kill the Indian in him and save the man.”110 The
boarding schools were based on this premise.111 The children were
typically not allowed to speak their native language, practice their
105. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84 (“These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They
are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. . . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties
in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.
This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court,
whenever the question has arisen.”).
106. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a
New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 602 (2002) [hereinafter
Atwood, Flashpoints].
107. Id.
108. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8–9.
109. Id.
110. N. SCOTT MOMADAY, THE MAN MADE OF WORDS 101 (1997); ROBERT ALLEN
WARRIOR, THE PEOPLE AND THE WORD: READING NATIVE NONFICTION 96 (2005) (“Pratt’s
famous educational philosophy was to prohibit the use of Native languages, creating a
linguistic distance from students’ home communities to parallel the physical distance the
was already enforced by being at the boarding school.”).
111. See generally DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION (1995); WARD
CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, SAVE THE MAN (2004).
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religion, or participate in cultural ceremonies.112 In fact, they were
often severely punished or whipped if they spoke their native
language or practiced their religion.113 Harry Saslow, a clinical
psychologist of the Albuquerque Boarding School, noted the
depersonalization and impersonalization of these boarding schools
and found that depression among the students was prevalent.114
The children were taken away from their homes at a young age,
and some did not see their families for the entire year.115 The
children felt lonely and deprived of their culture and did not fully
understand either their Indian culture or white man’s culture.116
F. Reorganization, Termination, and Self-Determination
In response to the failure of Allotment to wipe out Indian
culture, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (the IRA)
in 1934.117 The purpose of the IRA was to recognize and rejuvenate
tribal self-government.118 The IRA ended the policy of Allotment,
returned surplus Indian lands that were open for sale back to the
tribes, authorized tribes to obtain loans for economic development, encouraged tribes to adopt their own constitutions,119 and
limited the power of the BIA to micromanage tribal governance.120
Even so, this did not fix many of the issues that came from having
an outside source—the federal government—dictate Indian
affairs. The BIA still had close control over tribal government,121
and the IRA promoted an idea of government that was inconsistent with traditional Indian values;122 nevertheless, the IRA was
a step in the right direction. Although the IRA did not bestow on
the tribes powers they did not have, it did recognize their inherent
sovereignty and right to self-governance.123
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

470

Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 106, at 602.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8.
See WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 220–23.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
See WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 79.
See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 190–91.
Id. at 192.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 11.
Id.
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After the Reorganization Era, the federal Indian policy pendulum swung back, and Termination was implemented in the
1950s.124 The idea behind Termination was to repeal the IRA and
move to a federal policy of “complete integration” and full U.S.
citizenship of Indians.125 The purpose was to terminate the trust
relationship between the federal government and the tribes and
therefore eliminate “federal benefits and support services to the
terminated tribes.”126 Upon termination, tribes were ordered to
cease exercising governmental powers and give all tribal land to
tribal members.127 Tribal reservations were eliminated,128 and
tribal members were to be subject to the same laws and entitled to
the same rights and privileges as other United States citizens.129
Author Wilcomb E. Washburn explained Termination as a way to
“[w]ipe the slate clean” after years of sins committed against the
Indians.130 However, he noted that “our rhetoric of freedom and
liberation for the Indian at home was more a concern for freeing
our own conscience and our society of a burden, not so much of
meeting the needs and aspirations of the Indians.”131
Termination transferred power and many responsibilities
from the federal government to the states and did nothing to help
free the Indians.132 The states acquired full jurisdiction over previous reservation land and tribal members.133 Public Law 280 was
passed, which extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction into
Indian country.134 This legislation “transfer[red] responsibility for
the maintenance of law and order on certain reservations to state
and local authorities.”135 The educational responsibilities that were
previously regulated by the federal government and the tribes

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 200.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 87.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 205.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 12.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 203; WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 86–87.
WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 86.
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were transferred to the states.136 States also had increased legislative power over the tribes.137 In addition to educational authority,
the states would have authority over adoptions, alcoholism, land
use, and other social and economic areas.138
The Era of Self-Determination is the modern era. After the
disastrous effects of Termination on the tribes, federal Indian
policy again shifted in the late 1960s.139 President Nixon advanced
a new federal Indian policy of “self-determination.”140 The purpose of self-determination was to “strengthen the [Indians’] sense
of autonomy without threatening [their] sense of community.”141
Congress supported the rejection of Termination, which had discouraged self-sufficiency, and instead supported tribal control
over federal programs and education.142 Nearly all of the previously terminated tribes have been restored to recognition.143
Legislation favorable to Indian tribes was passed, including the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, and the Indian Child
Welfare Act.144
III. STATE FAMILY LAW JURISDICTION
The federal government’s decision to give tribal governments
jurisdiction over domestic cases falling in the bounds of ICWA
directly contrasts with the general principal that family law
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 203.
Id. at 206.
Id.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for
Indian Policy, H.R. D OC. NO. 91-363, 91st Cong. (2d Sess. July 8, 1970) (statement of Pres.
Richard Nixon).
142. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 218–19 (“In my judgment, it should be up to the
Indian tribe to determine whether it is willing and able to assume administrative
responsibility for a service program which is presently administered by a Federal
agency. . . . [W]e believe every Indian community wishing to do so should be able to
control its own Indian schools.”).
143. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 13.
144. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 220–21; PEVAR, supra note 5, at 13. See GETCHES
ET AL., supra note 19, at 220–24 for a list of prominent Self-Determination Era legislation
that favored Indian tribes (noting, however, that the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act was largely a policy statement and did not provide much religious protection for
tribes). The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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matters are left to the states to determine. The federal government
has been hesitant to resolve domestic issues and leaves family law
matters to the states, even though the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit federal courts from hearing family law issues.145 This
federalism division is based on the idea that federal courts should
exercise limited jurisdiction and defer to state courts where state
courts have developed an expertise in domestic relations issues.146
States generally decide cases involving marriage validity, divorce
grounds, adoption procedures, paternity claims, and custody standards.147 This opposition to considering family law issues has
developed through both legislation and judicial decision-making.148
The federal government desires to keep family law issues under
state jurisdiction because “[f]amily law is a traditional area of state
regulation, and it should be kept separate from the national business of the federal courts.”149 However, there are some aspects of
family law that have become “federalized.”150 This section will
address Supreme Court cases that illustrate the state court jurisdiction over family law issues as well as briefly address the federalization of certain family law cases.
A. Supreme Court Decisions
There are several Supreme Court cases that illustrate the
federal government’s reluctance to decide family law matters. One
of the earliest cases involving jurisdiction of family law issues is
Barber v. Barber.151 The issue in Barber was whether a divorced wife
could have a different domicile from her ex-husband, which
would allow her to sue in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction to recover for alimony due.152 The Court held that a wife
could establish a separate domicile from her husband.153 Although
Cahn, supra note 1, at 1073.
Id. at 1073–74.
WARDLE ET AL., supra note 11.
Cahn, supra note 1, at 1073.
Id.
See Linda D. Elrod, The Federalization of Family Law, 36 ABA HUM. RTS. MAG. 3
(2009), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human
_rights_vol36_2009/summer2009/the_federalization_of_family_law.html.
151. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858).
152. Id. at 584.
153. Id. at 597–98.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
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the issue involved payment of alimony, the Court clarified that
the issue was not about whether alimony would be allowed, but
whether this was a family law issue.154 The Court determined that
it was not.155 It stated, “this is not a suit asking the court for the
allowance of alimony. That has been done by a court of competent
jurisdiction. . . . We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the
courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the
allowance of alimony.”156 The federal government should not
have jurisdiction over family law matters.157 Although the majority and dissent disagreed over whether the issue at hand was a
family law matter, they both agreed that family law disputes
should be left to the jurisdiction of the state.158
Similarly, in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the Supreme Court upheld federal jurisdiction because it determined that the dispute in
question was a tort, not a family law matter.159 The Supreme Court
held that federal jurisdiction was proper in a domestic relations
torts case, where the lawsuit was not seeking a decree of divorce
or alimony or child custody orders, but rather was alleging that
the father committed torts against his daughters.160 The Court
asserted that federal jurisdiction was correct in this case because
domestic torts are not a traditional family law state matter.161

Id. at 584.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 602.
However, the dissenters in Barber (Chief Justice Taney, Justice Daniel, and Justice
Campbell), argued that a wife could not have separate domicile from her husband and that
the Court was encroaching on domestic relations matters best left to the states. Id. at 602
(Taney, J., dissenting) (“It is not in accordance with the design and operation of a Government having its origin in causes and necessities, political, general, and external, that it
should assume to regulate the domestic relations of society; should, with a kind of
inquisitorial authority, enter the habitations and even into the chambers and nurseries of
private families . . . .”). The dissenters in Barber, citing Coke and Blackstone, asserted the
common law principle that through marriage, a husband and wife become one person and
the wife has no legal identify separate from her husband. Id. at 600. They argued that the
federal government has jurisdiction in the same way English courts of chancery did. Cahn,
supra note 1, at 1077. Chancery courts did not have jurisdiction over divorce and alimony;
these family matters were left to ecclesiastical courts. Id. at 1089.
159. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 706–07 (1992).
160. Id.
161. Id.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

474

05.MACLACHLAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

455

9/7/18 10:05 AM

Tensions Underlying the ICWA

A more recent case that discuses family law jurisdiction is Elk
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.162 In Newdow, a father sued
the school district, alleging that recital of the Pledge of Allegiance
in his daughter’s school violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.163 The Court declined to rule on the constitutional question and held that the father lacked prudential standing to sue because he did not have custody over his daughter, and
it is not for the federal courts to determine issues of constitutional
law when “hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect
the outcome.”164
B. Federalization of Family Law
Although the Supreme Court largely leaves family law matters
to the states, it is important to point out that there has been a trend
toward federalization of family law.165 Despite not addressing the
constitutional question in Newdow, federal courts have taken
jurisdiction of family law matters with a constitutional element.
For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that a
Nebraska statute that only allowed foreign languages to be taught
to children who had passed the eighth grade violated the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.166 More recent Supreme
Court decisions have involved traditional state family law matters, including Roe v. Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges.167
Even though family law has been federalized to a greater
degree than in the past, issues of child custody and adoption—
barring a constitutional element—still fall squarely within the

162. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
163. Id. at 5.
164. Id. at 17 (“In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by

a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when
prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of
the plaintiff’s claimed standing. When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to
affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than
reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law.”).
165. See WARDLE, ET AL., supra note 11; see generally Elrod, supra note 150.
166. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). The educating of children is viewed
as a family law issue and is left primarily to parents to decide.
167. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (deciding the constitutionality of
state marriage restrictions); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (deciding the constitutionality
of state abortion restrictions).
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boundaries of traditional family law disputes left to states. However, with the passage of ICWA, the federal government has given
jurisdiction that would normally fall to the states instead to the
Indian tribes in Indian child custody cases.
IV. ICWA PURPOSES
A. ICWA as a Remedy for Removal
ICWA was enacted in 1978 to address the significant problem
of Indian children being removed from their homes and placed in
non-Indian boarding schools and homes.168 “Extensive congresssional hearings on the topic of Indian child welfare in the 1970s
established that ‘[t]he wholesale separation of Indian children
from their families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive
aspect of American Indian life today.’”169 A high percentage of
Indian child placements were in non-Indian homes and this
removal was threatening the survival of the tribes because they
were losing so many members.170 ICWA was a recognition by the
federal government of the importance of cultural identity for
Indian children.171 The purpose of ICWA was to protect Indian
culture, limit state jurisdiction, and recognize tribal authority over
adoption and custody issues involving Indian children.172 ICWA
shows concern for the interests of Indian children individually as
well as the tribe as a whole.173 Congressional findings state that
“there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence

168. See PEVAR, supra note 5, at 292.
169. Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 106, at 601 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 95th

Cong. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531).
170. Id. at 601–02. “In many states, two-thirds or more of the Indian child placements
were in non-Indian homes, and in some states the percentage was even higher. . . . Indian
families suffered from the loss of their children, and tribes, in turn, lost their membership.”
Id. at 602, 604.
171. Aliza G. Organick, Holding Back the Tide, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT AT THIRTY 221, 222 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Wenona T. Singel & Kathryn E.
Fort eds., 2009).
172. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132.
173. BARBARA ANN ATWOOD, CHILDREN, TRIBES, AND STATES: ADOPTION AND CUSTODY
CONFLICTS OVER AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN 163 (2010) [hereinafter ATWOOD, CHILDREN];
Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141,
145 (2004) (“ICWA, through its promotion of parental rights and tribal sovereignty, aims to
protect the very civil existence of Native Americans and tribal governance.”).
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and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.”174 During this
modern era, Congress has made it clear through the passing of
this Act that “it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families. . . .”175
B. Modern Era Removal
The Boarding School Era was the predecessor to later removal
efforts. Although removal of Indian children as an attempt to
“civilize” them is no longer an official U.S. policy as it was during
the Allotment Era, Indian children are still removed from their
homes at higher rates than those of other groups.176 In the mid1970s, between 25% and 35% of all Indian children had been
removed from their homes by states and placed in foster homes,
adoptive homes, or residential institutions.177 In one study involving sixteen states, 85% of the Indian children removed from their
families were placed in non-Indian homes.178
Some factors contributing to the high rate of removal involve socioeconomic problems that are prevalent in Indian communities. Many Indian communities suffer from disproportionately high rates of poverty, unemployment, substance abuse, and
domestic violence.179 These factors increase the likelihood that
children will be removed from their home by the state or tribes.180
While these factors contributed, the majority of removals of Indian
children when ICWA was passed did not occur as a result of
physical abuse or neglect of the child, but rather because of
cultural differences and bias.181 Additionally, the lack of state
understanding of Indian culture has contributed to Indian children being removed from their homes at higher rates.182 Even
174. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2012).
175. Id. § 1902.
176. ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 12–13; Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8,

at 131.
PEVAR, supra note 5, at 291.
Id.
ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 13.
See id.
Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back, 33 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 329, 361 (2008–09).
182. Id.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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though ICWA standards are meant to “reflect the unique values of
Indian culture,” states still often view Indian culture as a detriment to children.183 Prior to the passage of ICWA, child state
welfare officials were insensitive to the cultural family practices of
Indians, including the involvement of extended family to care for
children.184 These tribal norms were even viewed as neglect or
abandonment.185 Removals often occurred because a social worker
or judge assumed a child was being neglected if they were being
cared for by an extended family member instead of a nuclear
family member.186 Even now, many social workers are unfamiliar
with ICWA and social work students are rarely required to take
courses on ICWA.187
C. ICWA Provisions
To address these problems, ICWA establishes procedures state
courts must follow when dealing with Indian child custody
proceedings.188 ICWA applies only if the child is Indian. ICWA
defines an Indian child as “any unmarried person who is under
age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe.”189 The general premise of
ICWA is that it “establishes a preference for tribal court jurisdiction.”190 ICWA procedures include the following:
First, tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian
children who reside or are domiciled within the reservation and

Many judges and social workers simply did not comprehend or appreciate the
value American Indians placed on the holistic tribe and extended kin. Indeed,
tribal leaders pointed out that removals occurred because a social worker or
judge presumed neglect when childcare was performed by a member of the
child’s extended family outside the child’s nuclear family.
Id. at 361–62.
183. Id. at 383.
184. Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 106, at 603.
185. Id.
186. Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 362.
187. Cross, et al., supra note 12, at 3.
188. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132.
189. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012).
190. In re M.M., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
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concurrent tribal-state jurisdiction over Indian children who do
not live on the reservation.191
Tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children
who are wards of a tribal court, whether they live on or off
the reservation.192
If a foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding for an Indian child originates in state court, in the absence
of good cause, the court shall transfer the proceeding to tribal
court if the tribe or either parent requests the transfer, absent an
objection by either parent.193
If a child custody proceeding originates in state court, notice of
the proceeding must be given to the child’s tribe, and the tribe has
a right to intervene in the proceeding.194
The United States, the states, and every Indian tribe are to
give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe regarding Indian child
custody proceedings.195
For those cases regarding Indian children that remain in state
court, termination of parental rights requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and foster care placement requires a showing of
clear and convincing evidence.196
Finally, “[i]n an adoptive placement of an Indian child under
state law, preference for placement must be given in the following
order, unless the court can show good cause to the contrary: (1) a
member of the child’s extended family, (2) other members of the
child’s tribe, (3) other Indian families.”197

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

§ 1911(a)–(b); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132.
§ 1911(a); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132.
§ 1911(b); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 133.
§ 1911(c); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132–33.
§ 1911(d).
§ 1912(e); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 133.
§ 1915(a).
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V. STATE COURT CLASHES198
The application of ICWA from the time of its passage has been
inconsistent and unpredictable.199 Although some state courts
attempt in good faith to apply ICWA, other state courts seek to
find ways around ICWA through its ambiguous language such as
“good cause.”200 State court clashes against ICWA are shown
through judicially created exceptions to ICWA, which include
the best interest of the child exception and the existing Indian
family exception.201
Since the beginning of the federal-tribal relationship, the
United States has dealt with tribes as sovereign nations.202
Although federal Indian policy has swung back and forth with
regard to tribal rights and sovereignty, in our modern era, the
federal government has landed on the policy of self-determination
and support of tribal self-governance.203 State courts, however,
have historically refused to accept tribal sovereignty and have
pushed for authority over Indian tribes and their lands.204 For
example, in Worcester v. Georgia, missionaries who were living on
the reservation without state permission were arrested by the state
of Georgia.205 The Court held that the state laws did not apply
within the reservation and ordered Georgia to release the missionaries.206 Chief Justice John Marshall declared that Indian nations

198. Several ICWA scholars have used the term “clash” to characterize a number of
tensions involved in ICWA and tribal sovereignty, including but not limited to the following: state and tribal tensions; tensions between ICWA, parental, and child rights; and
cultural tensions dealt with in ICWA cases. I follow their lead and use the term “clash” to
characterize the state-tribal conflict because it illustrates the heightened tension and jurisdictional struggle between state courts and tribes regarding the application and administration of ICWA. See Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 106; Philip (Jay) McCarthy, Jr., The
Oncoming Storm: State Indian Child Welfare Act Laws and the Clash of Tribal, Parental, and Child
Rights, 15 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43 (2013).
199. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 134.
200. Id. at 134; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(b), 1915(a) (2012) (examples of the “good
cause” language).
201. Cross, et al., supra note 12 at 5.
202. See supra Part II.
203. See supra Section II.F.
204. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 138.
205. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 pet.) 515, 529 (1832).
206. Id. at 562.
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are inherently sovereign, independent political communities.207 Georgia refused to comply with the Supreme Court’s determination
that the state did not have authority to regulate Cherokee land.208
Recognition of tribal sovereignty by the states is not the root of
the problem. As in the past, some states continue to refuse to
accept tribal sovereignty. This trend is even more prominent in
cases involving child custody because these cases are family law
matters in addition to being civil disputes.209 Because child
custody issues involving ICWA would normally fall squarely
within traditional family law disputes left to states, many states
have pushed back against tribal jurisdiction in these family
matters.210 ICWA poses an obstacle to state courts’ exclusive
jurisdiction.211 The failure of state courts to properly apply ICWA
undermines the goal of the Act, which is to give tribes exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the best interests of Indian children.212 If
a tribe is not given notice about an Indian child custody proceeding, they do not have a voice in the proceeding and do not
have the opportunity to express their determination of the child’s
best interest.213 Even if the tribe is given notice, a state court could
still choose to violate ICWA by refusing to transfer jurisdiction of
the proceeding to tribal court.214
States’ jurisdiction over family law, and not tribal sovereignty,
seems to be the main reason states violate ICWA provisions. Even
states that do recognize the sovereignty of Indian tribes in ICWA
matters may not always do so, especially when faced with
difficult child custody and adoption determinations.215 These
difficulties stem in part from the increase of interracial marriages
between Indians and non-Indians.216 “Children who . . . have
blended or multiple cultural identities seem to trigger the most
207. Id. at 515, 559.
208. Id. at 515.
209. See generally Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 133; Painter-Thorne, supra note

181, at 380.
210. See Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 133.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 201, ch. 5.
216. Id. at 6–7.
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contentious battles under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
and the most difficult jurisdictional contests in interparental
disputes.”217 This is due to the fact that a non-Indian parent may
feel that the tribe will “side” with the Indian parent regarding
custody disputes, whereas an Indian parent may feel that his or
her concerns are not heard in state court. Another situation in
which a state court might refuse tribal jurisdiction is when a child
is in a stable home environment, has bonded with his or her
caretaker, and might suffer emotional and psychological harm if
that home placement is disrupted.218 However, even under difficult circumstances such as these, Congress has laid out its intent
in ICWA and state courts are obligated to apply ICWA. The
following sections explain two common “exceptions” state courts
have implemented in their desire to circumvent proper application of ICWA.
A. The Best Interest of the Child Exception
One example of these state-tribal court clashes is the apparent
“best interest of the child” standard219 used by many state courts
to justify placing or keeping children in non-Indian adoption or
foster-care families. Tribal courts generally believe that the best
interest of Indian children is to stay within their culture, whereas
state courts could easily promote a different perspective, based on
a “white, middle-class standard.”220 States have used the best

217. Id. at 7.
218. Id. at 202.
219. The best interest of the child standard is a general standard that guides courts to

some degree in family law cases including child custody, divorce, adoptions, visitation,
emancipation proceedings, etc. See John Thomas Halloran, Families First: Reframing Parental
Rights as Familial Rights in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L.
POL’Y 51, 67 (2014). “[T]he best interest standard attempts to impress upon the court the
importance of viewing the facts, circumstances, and law of the case by the subjective needs
of the child . . . .” Id. The standard is often vague and not easily defined. For example,
before allowing termination of parental rights, some states require a finding that “termination is in the best interest of the child.” Id. at 69. However, a vague definition is somewhat necessary. Halloran points out that “a universal proactive statutory definition of what
is in a child’s best interest may run contrary to the purpose of the best interest standard in
the first place because it seeks to impose specific guidelines on a condition that is as varied
as human experience.” Id. at 71.
220. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989) (quoting
H. R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 24 (1978)) (internal citations omitted).
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interest of the child standard as “good cause” to retain jurisdiction
over an ICWA matter rather than transferring the case to tribal
court.221 ICWA provides:
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled
or residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the
court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such
proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe.222

States also justify the use of this standard through language in
ICWA.223 Section 1902 of ICWA states that the policy underlying
the Act is “to protect the best interests of Indian children.”224 Problems with state court implementation of the best interest standard
is that it is indeterminate.225 The vagueness and case-by-case
analysis required coupled with state unfamiliarity and distrust of
Indian culture present a threat to the purposes of the Act.226
Research shows that state courts and judges use the AngloAmerican standard of psychological parent theory to determine
the child’s best interests.227 This theory involves bonding of
children to their caregiver and the principle that children require
continuity in those relationships for proper intellectual, emotional,
and social development.228 In states using this theory, unless
jurisdiction is transferred immediately to tribal court, state court
placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes creates greater
possibility and more time with which the child may bond with his
or her foster parent.229 However, the accuracy of the theory is not
established and “[a]pplying its already doubtful conclusions to
Native American families is questionable in light of testimony in
221. Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 615 (1994).
222. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
223. Carriere, supra note 221, at 616–17.
224. § 1902.
225. Carriere, supra note 221, at 617.
226. Id. at 618.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 618–20 (noting that this theory was used to analyze the best interest in cases
in which the court ultimately found good cause to deny transfer to tribal court, including In
re C.W. 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992), In re J.J. 454 N.W.2d 317, 331 (S.D. 1990), and In re
T.R.M. 525 N.E.2d 298, 307–08 (Ind. 1988)).
229. Carriere, supra note 221, at 622–23.
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the legislative history as to differences in Euro-American and
Native American child-rearing practices and values.”230
In Anglo-American culture and state and federal judicial determinations, parental rights are fundamental, and parents are seen as
having nearly absolute rights to rear their children as they see fit.231
In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court held that a Washington
statute that allowed any person to petition for child visitation with
a showing of the child’s best interest was unconstitutional because
it violated the mother’s fundamental liberty interest “in the care,
custody, and control of [her] children.”232
In Indian culture, however, extended family members play a
much larger role in visitation and sometimes in custody awards.233
In fact, some tribes have enacted grandparent visitation provisions.234 One reason for this cultural difference is that the community plays an important role in Indian tribes.235
[T]he voice of the collective—the Tribe—is a powerful force of
cultural identity and survival that may trump the individual
parent’s choice in child rearing. In the traditions of many Indian
tribes, kinship systems—including uncles, aunts, grandparents,
and other extended family members—play an essential role in
the care and education of children.236

ICWA accounts for Indian culture and its language reflects the
value of tribal community over individual rights in making child
custody determinations.237 ICWA’s purpose not only includes

230. Id. at 623.
231. ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 134.
232. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, (2000).

The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of
his or her child. In that respect, the court’s presumption failed to provide any
protection for Granville’s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions
concerning the rearing of her own daughters.
Id. at 69–70 (internal citation omitted).
233. ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 139, 132–42.
234. Id. at 137 (“The Rosebud Sioux Tribe, for example, has given its tribal court the
power to grant reasonable rights of visitation to grandparents with or without a petition of
the grandparents, so long as the court finds that visitation is in the best interests of
the children.”).
235. Id. at 136.
236. Id. at 136–37.
237. Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 363.

484

05.MACLACHLAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

455

9/7/18 10:05 AM

Tensions Underlying the ICWA

protecting the “best interests of Indian children” but also promoting “stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”238
B. The Existing Indian Family Exception
The existing Indian family exception is a court-created
doctrine that circumvents the purpose behind ICWA, despite the
fact that the plain language of ICWA does not provide for this
exception.239 Under the existing Indian family exception, if a court
deems that a child is not part of a sufficiently Indian family,240 the
court may refuse to apply ICWA in that case.241 ICWA defines
“Indian child” as an unmarried person under eighteen years old
and either a tribal member of a federally recognized tribe or
eligible for membership in a tribe and the biological child of a
tribal member.242 Tribes, not states, have the right to determine
tribal eligibility and membership. The existing Indian family
exception is applied in a minority of states, but in those states the
application of this exception undermines ICWA and denies Indian
children a right to their cultural identity.243 The Kansas Supreme
Court created the existing Indian family exception in 1982.244 In In
re Baby Boy L., a non-Indian mother sought to allow a non-Indian
couple to adopt her child.245 The father was a member of the
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, and the tribe intervened and sought to
place the child with extended family or the tribe.246 The court held

238. Id. at 358 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012)).
239. Organick, supra note 171, at 222; Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 332.
240. Under the existing Indian family exception, state courts give themselves the

power to determine whether an individual should be considered Indian or not, taking that
decision away from the tribes. Cheyañna L. Jaffke, The “Existing Indian Family” Exception to
the Indian Child Welfare Act: The States’ Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interest in Indian Children,
66 LA. L. REV. 733, 748 (2006).
Despite the fact that a tribe can recognize a person as a member, thereby making
them American Indian within the definitions of the ICWA, under the exception, a
state court ultimately determines if the member acts American Indian enough to
appease their perception of what an American Indian should do or be.
Id.
241. Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 367.
242. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012).
243. Organick, supra note 171, at 222.
244. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
245. Id. at 173.
246. Id.
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that ICWA’s purpose “was not to dictate that an illegitimate infant
who has never been a member of an Indian home or culture, and
probably never would be, should be removed from its primary
cultural heritage and placed in an Indian environment over the
express objections of its non-Indian mother.”247 The court reasoned that Congress did not intend ICWA to apply to cases in
which the child is not part of an Indian home or culture.248 Other
state courts have held similarly, reasoning that if the child is not
part of a recognizable Indian family, has not been exposed to
Indian culture, or does not have significant ties to the tribe, then the
purposes of the Act are not served and ICWA does not apply.249
States that apply the existing Indian family exception ignore
the plain language of ICWA.250 ICWA was intended to focus not
solely on the individual family, but to take into account the tribe’s
interest because of the impact of removal on the survival
of tribes.251
247. Id. at 175.
248. Id.
249. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“We hold that

under the Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
ICWA does not and cannot apply to invalidate a voluntary termination of parental rights
respecting an Indian child who is not domiciled on a reservation, unless the child’s biological parent, or parents, are not only of American Indian descent, but also maintain a
significant social, cultural or political relationship with their tribe.”); In re Adoption of
Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 311 (1992) (“[W]hether or when a child meets the definition of ‘Indian
child’ under ICWA is not controlling.”); In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1315–16
(2002) (“We do not, however, see that interest being served by applying the ICWA to a
multiethnic child who has had a minimal relationship with his assimilated parents, particularly when serving the tribal interests can serve no purpose which is sufficiently compelling to overcome the child’s fundamental right to remain in the home where he . . . is
loved and well cared for,” and attached to his foster parents.) (internal quotations omitted).
But California later passed Family Code section 170, which codified ICWA into state law in
order to abolish the existing Indian family exception.
250. Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 373–74; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989) (“The numerous prerogatives accorded the tribes
through the ICWA’s substantive provisions, [e.g., §§ 1911(a) (exclusive jurisdiction over
reservation domiciliaries), 1911(b) (presumptive jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries), 1911(c)
(right of intervention), 1912(a) (notice), 1914 (right to petition for invalidation of state-court
action), 1915(c) (right to alter presumptive placement priorities applicable to state-court
actions), 1915(e) (right to obtain records), 1919 (authority to conclude agreements with
States),] must, accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of
individual Indian children and families, but also of the tribes themselves.”).
251. B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to Vindicate the
Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State Courts, 73 N.D. L. REV. 395,
421–22 (1997) (noting that the existing Indian family exception “circumvent[s] the intent of
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VI. NEW ICWA GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS
To fully realize the purposes of ICWA, state court deference
must be improved and violations must cease. To that end, the
most important recent development in promoting the purposes of
ICWA are the new guidelines and rules which went into effect on
December 12, 2016.252 Additionally, state courts have previously
taken steps to promote the purposes of the Act and are continuing
to do so now. In recognizing the responsibility to correctly implement ICWA, one Montana state court noted that the court has a
“duty to preserve the unique cultural heritage and integrity of the
American Indians.”253 Some states have even passed their own
versions of ICWA that in some cases exceed the Indian child
protections of ICWA.254
A. ICWA Guidelines
In February 2015, former assistant secretary of Indian Affairs
Kevin Washburn announced that the BIA had published revised
ICWA guidelines to protect the rights of Indian families and
children under the Act and to prevent the breakup of Indian
families and destruction of tribes.255 Washburn stated that these
updates have become necessary due to the continued noncompliance of ICWA by state and federal courts.256 Two major situations
have pushed the government to find better ways to enforce
ICWA: the Supreme Court decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
and the consistent ICWA violations in South Dakota.257

Congress to ameliorate the almost 100 year history of the displacement of Indian
children . . . .”); Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 375.
252. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT (2016), https://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs
/groups/public/documents/text/idc2-056831.pdf [hereinafter BIA, GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEPT.
OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF I NDIAN AFFAIRS, RIN 1076-AF25, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
PROCEEDINGS, https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/pdf/idc1-034238.pdf
[hereinafter BIA, PROCEEDINGS]; Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15; Brewer, New ICWA
Guidelines, supra note 15.
253. In re Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 514 (Mont. 1996).
254. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 305.
255. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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In Adoptive Couple, the Supreme Court held that ICWA did not
apply when the Indian father had never had custody of the
child.258 Some of the facts in Adoptive Couple illustrate how ICWA
can be intentionally bypassed. In Adoptive Couple, the non-Indian
mother, who was not married to the Indian father, placed the
child for adoption without the consent of the father.259 When the
mother asked him via text message if he would rather pay child
support or terminate his parental rights, the father responded that
he relinquished his parental rights.260 The attorney of the mother
contacted the Cherokee Nation to determine if the father was
enrolled in the tribe.261 However, the attorney misspelled the
father’s name and incorrectly stated his birthday, and therefore,
the Cherokee Nation responded that it could not verify the
father’s membership.262 Four months after the baby was born, the
adoptive couple served the father notice of the adoption proceedings for the first time.263 The father promptly contacted an
attorney, and in the proceedings, he sought custody of the child
and stated that he did not consent to the adoption (regardless of
the fact that he told the mother earlier that he would relinquish
his parental rights).264 After the South Carolina Supreme Court
awarded custody of the child to the biological father, the
adoptive couple appealed, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.265
The Supreme Court held that several provisions in ICWA did
not apply and reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court, ordering the child to be returned to the adoptive parents. First, the
Court held that the ICWA provision requiring that active efforts
be made to prevent the breakup of Indian families before termination of parental rights can be ordered does not apply where the

258. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013); see also Kathryn E.
Fort & Peter S. Vicaire, The Invisible Families: Child Welfare and American Indian Active-Duty
Service Members and Veterans, FED. LAW ., Apr. 2015, at 40, 41.
259. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558–59.
260. Id. at 2558.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 2558–59.
265. Id. at 2559.
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child has never been in the custody of the Indian parent.266
Second, the Court held that the provision requiring a heightened
showing of harm to the child before parental rights can be involuntarily terminated does not apply where the child has never been
in the custody of the Indian parent.267 Finally, the Court held that
the placement preferences required by ICWA do not prevent a
non-Indian adoptive couple from adopting an Indian child when
no eligible Indian candidates have come forward.268
The Court’s confusing interpretation of ICWA in Adoptive
Couple parted with previous interpretations of the Act269 and
seemed in fact to endorse the existing Indian family exception
used by state courts.270 Assistant Secretary Washburn noted that
after the Supreme Court decided Adoptive Couple, tribal leaders
across the nation began to look for better ways to enforce ICWA
and protect Indian tribes.271 Washburn stated that, although the
Supreme Court decision in Adoptive Couple could not be reversed,
something needed to be done to address ICWA misapplications.272
In fact, the new guidelines confirm that state courts are prohibited
from using the existing Indian family exception, including whether the Indian parent ever had custody of the child.273

266. Id. at 2557 (noting that § 1912(d) “conditions involuntary termination of parental
rights with respect to an Indian child on a showing that remedial efforts have been made to
prevent the ‘breakup of the Indian family’ . . . .”); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012).
267. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557 (noting that § 1912(f) “bars involuntary
termination of a parent’s rights in the absence of a heightened showing that serious harm to
the Indian child is likely to result from the parent’s ‘continued custody’ of the child”);
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012).
268. Id. (referring to 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2012)).
269. Shreya A. Fadia, Note, Adopting “Biology Plus” in Federal Indian Law: Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl’s Refashioning of ICWA’s Framework, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 2007, 2008–09
(2014). Fadia labels the Court’s decision “confusing,” given “[t]he Court effectively ruled
that an individual is a parent under one of ICWA’s provisions, but that the same individual
is not a parent under two other ICWA provisions.” Id. at 2009.
270. Shawn L. Murphy, Note, The Supreme Court’s Revitalization of the Dying “Existing
Indian Family” Exception, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 629, 630–31 (2014).
271. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15.
272. Id.
273. See BIA, GUIDELINES, supra note 252, at 15. The “Existing Indian Family” exception is listed in the guidelines under “Factors that May Not Be Considered.”
If a child-custody proceeding concerns a child who meets the statuary
definition of “Indian child,” then the court may not determine that ICWA does
not apply based on factors such as the participation of the parents or the Indian
child in Tribal, cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship
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Assistant Secretary Washburn identified ongoing ICWA violations by the state of South Dakota as a second concern that
prompted government action to reinforce ICWA provisions.274
Although many states continue to ignore or misapply ICWA provisions and purposes, South Dakota is one of the worst offenders.275 The Indian child population in South Dakota is only nine
percent; however, Indian children make up about fifty-three
percent of the total number of children in foster care in the state.276
Upon moving to South Dakota, Patrice Kunesh investigated
the state’s inadequate social welfare and criminal justice systems
as they relate to Indians and tribal communities.277 She found that
Indians are highly overrepresented in South Dakota’s welfare and
criminal justice systems.278 South Dakota has utilized the best
interest of the child exception to refuse transfer of Indian child
custody proceedings to tribal court.279 The South Dakota Supreme
Court has held that the needs and interests of the children
must prevail and that ICWA is not meant as a shield to allow
Indian children to be abused by their parents.280 However, this
line of reasoning reveals that the state may believe the tribe will
not consider these factors or do what is in the best interest of
Indian children.281
The BIA responded to Adoptive Couple and consistent ICWA
violations by holding listening sessions and gathering comments.
In 2014, the BIA held five listening sessions with tribes, judicial
between the Indian child and his or her parents, whether the parent ever had
custody of the child, or the Indian child’s blood quantum . . . .
Id.; NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N, SUMMARY OF THE 2016 ICWA GUIDELINES 2,
https://www.nicwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2017ICWAGuidelinesSummary-1.pdf.
274. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Patrice H. Kunesh, A Call for an Assessment of the Welfare of Indian Children in South
Dakota, 52 S.D. L. REV. 247, 247 (2007).
278. Id. at 249–50.
279. Amanda B. Westphal, An Argument in Favor of Abrogating the Use of the Best
Interests of the Child Standard to Circumvent the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act in South Dakota, 49 S.D. L. REV. 107, 125 (2003).
280. In re S.G.V.E., 634 N.W.2d 88, 94 (S.D. 2001) (“We have always recognized that
the needs of the children are paramount and that their best interests must prevail.”); In re
S.D., 402 N.W.2d 346, 351 (S.D. 1987) (“Children should not be abused, neglected, or
forlorned under the guise of cultural identity.”).
281. Westphal, supra note 279, at 127.
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organizations, and child welfare professionals to understand
custody situations and decide how best to address ICWA violations.282 The BIA also gathered hundreds of comments from tribes,
child welfare professionals, and state court judges.283 The vast
majority of comments submitted in response to the BIA’s request
asked the agency to update the ICWA guidelines,284 which had
not been updated since they were first published in 1979.285
Washburn stated:
For too many years, some of Indian country’s youngest and
most vulnerable members have been removed from their
families, their cultures, and their identities . . . . Congress worked
hard to address this problem by enacting the Indian Child
Welfare Act. Yet, today too many people are unaware of this
important law and, unfortunately, there are some that work
actively to undermine it. Our updated guidelines for state courts
will give families and tribal leaders comfort that the Obama
Administration is working hard to provide better clarity so that
the courts can carry out Congress’ intent to protect tribal
families, preserve tribal communities, and promote tribal continuity now and into the future.286

B. ICWA Rule
The new ICWA regulations and guidelines went into effect on
December 12, 2016.287 The regulations are binding law on state
courts, whereas the guidelines are recommendations to assist state
courts in implementing ICWA.288 ICWA had not been revised
since its enactment in 1978 until the BIA published the new
federal regulations in June 2016.289 Principle Deputy Assistant
282. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15 (noting that three listening sessions
included tribes and two included judicial organizations).
283. Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15.
284. Id.
285. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Assistant Sec’y–Indian
Affairs, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y Roberts Announces Updated BIA Guidelines That
Strengthen Implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act with Focus on Family
Unification (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/id
c2-058432.pdf.
286. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15.
287. See BIA, GUIDELINES, supra note 252, at 4.
288. Id.
289. 25 C.F.R. § 23 (2016); Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15.
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Secretary Lawrence S. Roberts290 announced that the new rule
would deliver a more consistent interpretation and application of
ICWA for child welfare workers, judges, state agencies, and
state courts.291
According to Roberts, “the new rule advances the highest
ideals of the federal trust responsibility in protecting and promoting cohesiveness for Indian children and their families.”292 The
rule clarifies ICWA’s requirements, fosters consistency in Indian
child custody proceedings, and promotes the purposes of the Act,
which are to maintain Indian family and community.293 Under this
new rule, when state courts encounter cases dealing with fostercare, parental-rights-termination, and adoption proceedings, the
courts will now be required to determine whether the child is an
Indian child under ICWA definitions.294 State courts will be required to give prompt notice of involuntary proceedings and minimize unnecessary separations between Indian children and their
families.295 The rule also updates and clarifies ICWA definitions.296
Tribes and other commentators nearly universally noted the
lack of ICWA compliance and consistency in state courts.297
During public meetings held throughout the country, including in
Rapid City, South Dakota, comments from the tribes and members of the adoption industry conflicted over what constitutes the
“best interests” of Indian children.298 However, Roberts noted that
reunification with the child’s family is the gold standard of ICWA,
and the new rule strives to correct the disparities among Indian
children in state custody.299 Sally Jewell, chair of the President’s
White House Council on Native American Affairs stated, “ICWA

290. Roberts served as acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs from January 1,
2016, to July 28, 2016, following Kevin Washburn.
291. Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See SUMMARY OF THE 2016 ICWA GUIDELINES, supra note 273.
297. Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15; see also Allison E. Davis, Roadway to
Reform: Assessing the 2015 Guidelines and New Federal Rule to the Indian Child Welfare Act’s
Application to State Courts, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 91 (2016).
298. Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15, at ¶ 13.
299. Id.
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was designed to safeguard Native children from undue separation
from their families and cultural identity. This rule will achieve
consistent implementation of a law that remains critical to protecting the best interest of Native children and promoting successful Native communities . . . .”300
C. Potential Effects of These Guidelines and Rules
Although it remains to be seen what effects the new
regulations will have, the new rules and guidelines provide a
reasonable expectation of improvement in state ICWA application
because they clarify ICWA procedures. At the very least, state
courts may have a more difficult time using ICWA’s ambiguities
to support violations of the Act. However, the best interest of the
child exception may continue to be used as a state court exception
because the new rule fails to specify a definition for “best interests
of the Indian child.”301 In response to commentator request for a
“best interest” definition, the BIA stated that it is not necessary to
define this term because it does not appear in the final ICWA
rule.302 It is the BIA’s contention that a definition is not needed
because “ICWA was specifically designed to protect the best
interests of Indian children. . . . through specific provisions that
are designed to protect children and their relationship with their
parents, extended family, and Tribe.”303 Furthermore, these procedures and objective rules avoid court decisions being made based
on subjective values.304
Although the new rule does not use the nomenclature of the
existing Indian family exception,305 the rule is likely adequate to
discontinue the use of the exception in the few states that continue
its practice. The BIA refused to explicitly include a provision in
the rule that states there is no existing Indian family exception
because ICWA already defines an Indian child based on the

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id.
BIA, PROCEEDINGS, supra note 252, at 74.
Id.
Id. at 74–75.
Id. at 75.
See id.
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child’s political affiliation with a tribe.306 ICWA does not include a
provision that allows a court to determine whether a child is
Indian based on the child’s or parent’s social, cultural, or geographic ties to the tribe.307 In fact, Congress expressly recognized
that state courts were ill equipped to make determinations of the
tribal relations of Indian people.308 The BIA noted that only a
handful of courts continue to apply the existing Indian family
exception and the great majority of states have affirmatively
rejected it, including South Dakota.309 However, the BIA did
decide to include in the rule a “mandatory prohibition on consideration of certain listed factors, because they are not relevant to
the inquiry of whether the statute applies.”310 Prohibited factors
include “the participation of the parents or the Indian child in
Tribal cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship between the Indian child and his or her parents, whether
the parent ever had custody of the child, or the Indian child’s
blood quantum.”311
Revised definitions address ambiguities in the Act. For example, one concern is that states have identified a foster home as an
“Indian home” under ICWA because an Indian child is placed
there, regardless of whether the foster parents were Indian.312 The
new rule clarifies that an “Indian foster home” is one where one
or more of the foster parents is Indian.313
Although not likely to completely eliminate future state
violations of ICWA, the new rule and guidelines are a big step
forward in addressing ICWA ambiguities and state court misapplication of the Act.

Id. at 91.
Id.
Id. at 91–92.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 78.
Id.; see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2016) (“Indian foster home means a foster home
where one or more of the licensed or approved foster parents is an ‘Indian’ as defined in
25 U.S.C. 1903(3).”).
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Indian Child Welfare Act has shed light on issues of state
and tribal sovereignty as well as the failure of state courts to
recognize tribal jurisdiction in Indian child custody cases that fall
under ICWA. Throughout the history of U.S. and Indian tribal
relations, the federal government has recognized the inherent
sovereignty of tribes yet diminished their power. Modern federal
Indian policy, though, seeks to promote tribal self-governance.
One response to modern federal Indian policy is the passing of
ICWA to reverse the negative effects of widespread removal of
Indian children from their homes. ICWA provides tribal courts
with jurisdiction over custody and adoption proceedings involving Indian children.
However, states have pushed back against the federal
government taking domestic relations matters out of their hands.
Traditionally, the federal government has allowed state courts the
authority to determine family law disputes. However, ICWA is a
major wrench in state court jurisdiction over family law matters.
Since the passage of ICWA, states have used a number of judicially created exceptions to get around proper application of ICWA.
Although some states have reversed their incompliance with the
Act, inconsistent application continues to be problematic. In 2015
and 2016, the Bureau of Indian Affairs finally addressed these
issues by passing revised ICWA guidelines and rules to clarify
ICWA procedures and definitions. The hope is that the rules will
better promote the purposes of ICWA in providing protection and
cohesiveness for Indian children, families, and communities.
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